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Abstract
The belief that the behaviour and outcomes of compulsory school students
are aﬀected by their peers has been important in shaping education policy. I
analyze two polar education systems -tracking and mixing- and propose sev-
eral criteria for their comparison. The system that maximizes average human
capital, I ﬁnd, depends crucially on the level of complementarity between peer
eﬀects and individuals’ ability. I also ﬁnd that when mean innate ability is
much higher among the rich than among the poor, the system that best maxi-
mizes average human capital is mixing. However, there is no unanimity in the
overall population so as to which system to choose.
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Interest in social interactions, neighborhood eﬀects, and social dynamics has recently
undergone a revival. As a consequence of this new trend, a small body of literature
has emerged that studies the way neighborhood eﬀects can generate and perpetuate
persistent inequality. One of this neighborhood eﬀects is the so-called “peer eﬀect”,
deﬁned here as the eﬀect on an individual’s academic performance of the ability
distribution of her peers.1 The critical importance to both parents and policy makers
of peer group distribution in school is indisputable, since peer eﬀe c t sh a v ep l a y e d
an important role in a number of policy debates, including that surrounding the
controversial subjects of ability tracking and school desegregation.
Given the existence of peer eﬀects, it is not surprising that governments should
want to keep them in mind when planning how best to meet their educational policy
objectives. One situation in which peer eﬀects must be carefully considered is when
governments must choose whether to stream (track) or mix students of diﬀering abil-
ities within the public school classroom. This paper contributes to this debate by
addressing three main questions. First, it asks which system best maximizes average
human capital at the compulsory school level. Second, it explores whether the over-
all population can be said to prefer one of the aforementioned systems-tracking and
mixing- over the other. Finally, it considers how the existence of a positive depen-
dence between parental background and individual ability aﬀects the two previous
issues.
The practice of grouping students on the basis of ability (tracking), while common
in the USA and Europe, remains a controversial one.2 The main argument in favor of
this system is that, by grouping together students of similar abilities levels, teachers
can target instruction to a level more closely aligned with other students’ needs than
1Roemer and Wets (1994) and Streufert (2000) show how economic segregation can lead to
inaccurate assessments of the economic payoﬀ to education. The idea is that by depriving children
in poor neighborhoods of successful role models (which is an inevitable consequence of economic
segregation), they make inferences on the beneﬁts of education that are biased downward.
2For the US case, public school teachers reported that only 14.4% and 10.8% of tenth-grade








would be possible in more heterogenous environments. On the other hand critics argue
that such segregation deprives disadvantaged students of any positive peer inﬂuences
that they might have gained by interacting with their more able peers. In keeping
with this view, there has been considerable movement in the US towards eliminating
ability grouping in public schools.3
While the inﬂuence of peer ability on one’s own educational achievement is well
documented, the ﬁne points of this relationship are still being debated. Most studies
focus on average innate ability within the classroom as the peer-based factor that most
strongly impacts on individual achievement.4 On the one hand, for example, Evans,
Oates and Schwab (1992) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant peer group eﬀect that vanishes when they
control for endogeneity. On the other hand, Henderson, Mieszkowski, and Sauvageau
(1978), Summers and Wolfe (1977) and more recently Robertson and Symons (1996),
Hoxby (2000), and Zimmer and Toma (2000) report signiﬁcant positive inﬂuences of
higher achieving peers on achievement.
The existence of peer eﬀects and their links with diﬀerent grouping policies have
been studied at the theoretical as well as the empirical level. Most of the literature
on the subject tends to analyze the practical eﬀects of grouping students by ability,
arriving at the conclusion that ability grouping- unlike mixing - almost inevitably
hurts low-track students while favoring high-track ones. However, there is no clear
evidence as to whether the losses of the former are oﬀset by the gains of the latter (see,
for example, Argys et al.(1996), Betts and Shkolnik (2000), Figlio and Page (2000) and
most recently Kang (2007)). Theoretical contributions are fewer in number. Among
others we ﬁnd the works by de Bartolome (1990), Epple, Newlon and Romano (2002)
and Arnott and Rowse (1987).
This paper is closely related to that of Arnott and Rowse (1987), who analyze
the optimal allocation of students and resources when peer eﬀects are present by
focusing on the degree of concavity of peer group eﬀect. They conclude that, when the
objective is to maximize mean performance, optimal allocation of students abilities
depends on the properties of the education production function. However, they fail to
3For example, data from the Schools and Staﬃng Survey suggest than 20% of schools with
programs for gifted children in 1990 had eliminated the programs by 1993 (Figlio and Page (2000)).







consider the role of family background in the process of human capital accumulation,
despite its importance at the compulsory school level (see Heckman (2000)). They
also focus on the role played by the degree of concavity of the peer group eﬀect on the
key goal of maximizing mean achievement, even though they admit that this narrow
focus prevents them from seeing the possible dependence of individual welfare on the
whole shape of human capital distribution in the population.
My approach diﬀers from that of Arnott and Rowse (1987) in two key respects.
First, in addition to considering how family background aﬀects student achievement,
I also acknowledge the existence of a positive dependence between family background
and innate ability, and its eﬀect on the optimal allocation of students. Second, and
in light of the most recent empirical evidence, I assume concavity in peer eﬀects and
discuss how the complementarity between peer characteristics and individual ability
(a point for which the empirical evidence is still quite mixed) can determine which
system best maximizes average human capital.5 In addition, my paper contributes
to the relevant literature by comparing both systems in terms of the induced distri-
butions of human capital at the end of compulsory school.
I ﬁnd that, in societies where the mean ability of rich students greatly exceeds
that of their poorer classmates, average human capital is maximized by mixing in
most of cases. This is true regardless of the degree to which peer eﬀects and innate
ability can be seen as complementary. We ﬁnd that, under mixing, those societies
where mean innate ability is (much) higher among the rich than among the poor will
also have (much) higher average human capital. However, this might not be the case
if the prevailing education system is tracking. The intuition is that, as the diﬀerence
between mean ability of rich students versus poor students increases, so too does the
threshold separating students in the low ability group from those in the high ability
group. As this diﬀerence increases, therefore, the average income level of the students
remaining in the low ability group tends to diminish while that of the students in the
high ability group tends to rise. As a result, average human capital will not always be
much higher in those societies where the diﬀerence between mean ability of the two
5Henderson et al.(1978), Summer and Wolfe (1977) and more recently Zimmer and Toma (2000)








income groups is much higher. I also ﬁnd that the system that best maximizes average
human capital at compulsory level depends on the level of complementarity between
the peer eﬀect and individuals’ innate ability. In particular, when peer eﬀects matter
more for low (high) ability students than for high (low) ability students, average
human capital is maximized under mixing (tracking), which is the system where low
(high) ability students enjoy a stronger peer eﬀect.
Finally my study suggest that, among risk averse individuals the preference for
mixing versus tracking depends on the degree of complementarity between the peer
eﬀect and individuals’ innate ability. If they are nearly complementary, then there is
no preferred system in the population. However, in some empirically relevant cases
in which the two variables act as substitutes, I ﬁnd that, it is mixing the system
unanimously preferred in the population.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and
the main features of human capital distribution under the two education systems
at compulsory school level. Section 3 compares the induce distributions of human
capital in these two systems. Section 4 concludes.
2M o d e l
2.1 Individuals
Population size is constant at 1. Individuals diﬀer in two aspects: their innate ability,
θ0, and their family background, denoted by z (therefore z could be either the parental
income level or the parents’ human capital). To make the model tractable, I assume
that family background z takes only two values, 1 and x>1 with probabilities 1−λ
and λ, respectively. I refer to those with income 1 (x)a st h ep o o r( r i c h ) .T oc a p t u r e
the possibility that some level of positive dependence exists between income and
innate ability, I assume that innate ability is uniformly distributed on [0,1] for the







function) of innate ability, denoted by F(θ0), can be expressed as:
F(θ0)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
µ








θ0 if 1 ≤ θ0 ≤ k.
1 if θ0 >k .
(1)
That is, the conditional mean of innate ability depends on the parental income level.
Note ﬁrst that parental income and parental ability are highly correlated and second,
according to the empirical evidence found by Plug and Vijverberg (2003), parents’
ability and the ability of the child are correlated too.6 Thus, the two characteris-
tics that deﬁne the individual, parental income and innate ability, will be positively
correlated as well.
Individuals accumulate human capital by attending compulsory education, which
is free of charge, and they are not allowed to work.
Note that mean income is λx +( 1− λ) and income inequality, measured by the
income variance in the population, is (x − 1)2λ(1 − λ). Both are increasing with x.
Below we analyze the eﬀect of mean income on the human capital distribution under
both education systems.
2.2 Production of Human Capital
At compulsory level individuals are separated into diﬀerent groups or classes. To
simplify matters, I will assume that there are only two groups. The production of
human capital depends on three factors. The ﬁrst is the individual’s innate ability,
θ0. The second is the “formal schooling” or “peer group” eﬀect that depends on the
characteristics of the group in which the individual is placed. These characteristics
are summarized by the mean ability of the group j or “peer” eﬀect, denoted by θ0
j
.
The third is “informal schooling” and refers to family background eﬀects, captured
by z. After attending compulsory education an individual with innate ability θ0 ends
up with a level of human capital θ1.
6In particular Plug and Vijverberg (2003) conclude that about 55-60 percent of the parental







To conduct the analysis, I must choose a functional form for the production of
human capital. I simplify this production function by assuming that it is Cobb-
Douglas over “informal schooling” z, and a CES aggregate of the two remaining
inputs, θ0 and θ0
j
. This type of production function allows us to evaluate how average
human capital under tracking and mixing is aﬀected by the degree of complementarity
between the peer group eﬀect and innate ability. Thus, I assume that θ1 = z1−β1 e θ1
β1
where e θ1 is a constant returns to scale CES of θ0 and θ0
j
.
These three inputs can be combined in two alternative ways using this Cobb-
Douglas speciﬁcation.7 Each alternative allows two elasticities of substitution to be
equal to 1, and the third one to vary between 0 and inﬁnite. The ﬁrst alternative
is θ1 = θ0
j1−β1 e θ1
β1,w h e r ee θ1 is a constant returns to scale CES of θ0 and z,a n d
the second alternative is θ1 = θ
1−β1
0 e θ1
β1 where e θ1 is a constant returns to scale CES
of θ0
j
and z. These two alternatives restrict the elasticity of substitution between
θ0 and θ0
j
to be equal to 1. This restriction is an important shortcoming since the
empirical evidence regarding the relationship between individuals’ innate ability and
peer group eﬀect is still mixed. Henderson et al. (1978) ﬁnd no interaction between
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> 0 and Summers and Wolfe (1977) ﬁnd some





Thus, I use the functional form θ1 = z1−β1 e θ1
β1 in the analysis in order to study how
the complementarity between peers’ eﬀect and individuals’ innate ability aﬀects the












where β1 and β2 ∈ (0,1).T h eﬁnal level of human capital θ1,i sat w i c ed i ﬀerentiable,
increasing and concave function. Equation (2) allows for the possibility that θ0
j
and θ0 are either complements or substitutes, since β2 determines the elasticity of
substitution between these two inputs.8
The importance of parental education in the acquisition of human capital at the
7See also Krusell et al (2000).
8In particular, for β2 close to 0,b o t hθ0
j
and θ0 have some level of complementarity and as β2







individual level has been explored theoretically as well as empirically. Feinstein and
Symons (1999) ﬁnd that parental interest is the principal way in which the attain-
ments of each generation are passed to the next. They also suggest the complemen-
tarity between parental interest and peer eﬀect. In keeping with these conclusions, I
assume that the positive inﬂuence of peer eﬀect on the production of human capital
rises as parental income increases as can be checked from Equation (2). Finally, em-
pirical evidence establishes that the peer group eﬀect is non-linear: the achievement
level of students rises with an improvement in the average quality of their classroom,
but this positive eﬀect has decreasing returns.9
2.3 Education Systems at Compulsory Level
In this section, I describe the two polar education systems of mixing and tracking
and analyze the distribution of human capital at the end of compulsory school under
each system.
2.3.1 Mixing
Under mixing the ability distribution is the same in both classrooms. The average
ability within each classroom, denoted here as θ0
m





1 − λ + kλ
2
. (3)
However, as individuals diﬀer in their parents’ level of human capital, there will
be two income groups within each classroom: the rich and the poor. Among the poor
students θ1 will follow a uniform distribution on the support [a0,c 0], while among the
rich students θ1 will follow a uniform distribution on the support [b0,d 0],w h e r ec0 and
d0 denote the level of human capital θ1 acquired by the “best” (most able) individual
in the rich and the poor income group, respectively, and a0 and b0 denote the level of
human capital θ1 acquired by the “worst” (least able) individual in the rich and the




































Under mixing, therefore, the C.D.F. of human capital at the end of compulsory
education, denoted by FM(θ1),i s :
FM(θ1)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨

































if c0 ≤ θ1 ≤ d0.





It can be checked that, ceteris paribus, if in society A the diﬀerence in terms
of mean ability between the rich and the poor is larger than in society B, then the
distribution of human capital under mixing FM(θ1) in society A will dominate the
one in society B. This is because mean ability among the rich is the only determinant
of the diﬀerence in average human capital between the rich and the poor. As shown
in Figure 1, below, this implies an increase in the expected value of θ1 under mixing.
Here, the case k =1is represented in red and k =2in green:










































































Thus EM(θ1) is an average of the mean values of θ1 in the two income groups, with
respective weights (1 − λ) and λ. Finally we also ﬁnd that EM(θ1) is an increasing
function of the wealth level in the population, measured by both x and λ and also
increasing with k as we saw above.
2.3.2 Tracking
Tracking students implies grouping them on the basis of innate ability. For the sake
of simplicity, I permit only two tracks and use the median level of innate ability as
a threshold for grouping students into one track or the other. Thus, a student is






The following assumption ensures that there will be at least one poor student in
the high track.
Assumption 1 (A.1): λ<(1/2).
The previous assumption ensures that m(k,λ) < 1 and thereby placing a non-
negative proportion of poor students in the high track.10
The distribution of human capital within each track is uniform but with diﬀerent




the average ability in the high and low tracks
10Note from (3) and (10) that the initial distribution of innate ability, is right-skewed, that is
m(k,λ) < θ
m





















Again, there will be two income groups within each track. In the low track, θ1
follows a uniform distribution on [a,c] among the poor, while among the rich it follows
a uniform distribution on [b,e],w h e r ec and e denote the level of human capital θ1
acquired in the low track by the “best” (most able) individual in the poor and the
rich income groups, respectively, and a and b denote the human capital acquired in


























Likewise, in the high track, θ1 follows a uniform distribution on [d,g] among the
poor, while among the rich it follows a uniform distribution on [f,h].W ed e n o t eb y
d and f the human capital θ1 acquired in the high track by the “worst” (least able)
individual in the poor and rich groups, respectively. We denote by g and h the human































From Equation (2) above we have that, given two individuals with the same innate
ability level, the one whose parents are rich will always attain a higher level of human







one will always attain a higher level of human capital. This can also be checked from
Equations (12) to (19) above, i.e., ﬁrst a<b , c<e , d<fand g<h , and second
c>a ,e>b ,g>dand h>f.
The next assumption ensures that the support of θ1 in the low track “partially”
overlaps the support of θ1 in the high track.
Assumption 2 (A.2): g>e>d .
In other words, the “best” individual in the low track (a rich individual with
θ0 = m) obtains more human capital than the “worst” individual in the high track
(a poor individual with θ0 = m). Moreover, it implies that the “best” individual
in the high track among the poor (an individual with θ0 =1 ) obtains more human
capital than the “best” individual in the low track among the rich (an individual with
θ0 = m).
This assumption implies a restriction on x, β1, β2 and k.F o rs o m eﬁxed β1, β2

























That is, x must be high enough to oﬀset the disadvantage of being in the low
track, but not too high to oﬀset the disadvantage of having poor parents.
Note from Equations (17) and (18) that Assumption 2 implies that f(k,λ) >
g(k,λ). That is, the “best” poor individual in the high track obtains less human
capital than the “worst” rich individual in the high track.
Figure 2 illustrates the diﬀerent intervals for θ1 and the relationship between them,
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Figure 2: Educational Systems
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if f ≤ θ1 ≤ h
1 if θ1 >h .
(21)
It can be checked that, ceteris paribus, if in society A the diﬀerence in terms







opposite to mixing, the distribution of human capital under tracking FT(θ1) in society
A will not dominate the one in society B. Figure 1 represents the case k =1in blue
and k =2in green:










The intuition of the previous result is as follows. From (10) and (11) we have that




,a n dt h em e d i a nm
will be higher in society A than they are in B. Thus, the proportion of poor (rich)
students in the low track will be higher (lower) in society A than in society B, and
the reverse occurs in the high track. Consequently, as can be checked from (21) and
Figure 3, the decrease in the average human capital of rich students in the low track
implies that FT(θ1) will be higher in society A than in society B for intermediate
values of θ1. In addition, the increase in the average human capital in all remaining
cases implies that FT(θ1) will be lower in society A than it will be in society B for all
remaining values of θ1.
Therefore, and opposite to mixing, the higher the diﬀerence between the mean
innate ability of rich and poor kids, the resulting FT(θ1) will not dominate any pre-
vious distribution of human capital in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance.
However, as we see below it implies a higher expected value of θ1.



































As with mixing, the expected value of θ1 is a weighted average of the mean value of
θ1 in the four income groups analyzed above. It is also increasing in both x and λ.
Under tracking, the eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nm e a ni n n a t ea b i l i t ya m o n gr i c hs t u d e n t s
(captured by an increase in k) on the average human capital is positive, but not as
strong as it is under mixing. The reason for this can be explained as follows. As we
saw above, a higher k implies a higher average ability among both high and low track
students, and a lower (higher) mean income among low (high) track students. Due
to the complementarity between peer eﬀect and family background in the production
of human capital (see Equation (2)), the increase in mean income of students in the
high track has a clear positive impact on the average human capital in this group.
H o w e v e r ,t h ed e c r e a s ei nm e a ni n c o m ei nt h el o wt r a c ki m p l i e st h a ta v e r a g eh u m a n
capital might not always increase in that track.11
3 A comparison of mixing and tracking
L e tu ss u p p o s e ,ﬁrst of all, that the educational system is chosen by majority voting
and that every individual will vote for the system under which her ﬁnal level of human
capital θ1 is higher. In this case, exactly half of the population will prefer mixing
(those with θ0 <m ), since under tracking they would placed into the low track,
where they would enjoy a lower peer eﬀect. The other half will prefer tracking (those
with θ0 >m ), since they would placed into the high track, where they would enjoy a
higher peer eﬀect. We see that 1
2 prefers mixing and 1
2 prefers tracking, which means
that choosing one system over the other will always produce winners and losers.
Next I propose to see what happens if individuals must choose the education
system without knowing their own characteristics. In particular they ignore the value
of θ0 that they will end up enjoying.12 Again, I assume that they would like to have













































12This approach is known as the “Veil of Ignorance”, widely used in modern Welfare Economics
(see for example the seminal works of Harsanyi (1953 and 1955) and Rawls (1971)). Under this
approach, to evaluate alternative systems, individuals must put themselves behind a hypothetical







as much of θ1 as possible.
One possibility is just to compare both systems in terms of average human capi-
tal.13 However, due to the complexity of the above human capital production func-
tion, I cannot obtain clear analytical results regarding the comparison of average hu-
man capital. However we can extract some conclusions using numerical simulations.
The most important one is that the diﬀerence between average human capital under
the two systems, ET(θ1)−EM(θ1), decreases with β2. The following table presents the
value of β2,f o rd i ﬀerent values of β1 and k, such that ET(θ1)−EM(θ1)=0 ,d e n o t e d
it by c β2.T h u s ,f o rβ2 below (above) c β2 we have that ET(θ1) − EM(θ1) > (<)0:14
Table1.A v e r a g eH u m a nC a p i t a l: c β2
β1 \ k 1.25 1.5 1.75 2
1/4 0.77 0.74 0.72 0.69
1/2 0.86 0.85 0.82 0.79
3/4 0.95 0.94 0.92 0.910
(23)
We can conclude that if β2 is small, i.e., when θ0
j
and θ0 have some level of
complementarity, then average human capital is always maximized under tracking.
As β2 tends to 1, meaning that as the two factors become closer substitutes, average
human capital is maximized under mixing. To put it diﬀerently, when peer eﬀects
matter more for low (high) ability students than for high (low) ability students,
average human capital is maximized under mixing (tracking), which is the system
where low (high) ability students enjoy a stronger peer eﬀect.
Note also that, as the role of family background in human capital accumulation
diminishes (β1 increases) tracking maximizes average human capital for most values
of β2. Finally, it can also be checked that in societies where the diﬀerence in mean
ability of rich versus poor individuals is low (i.e., when k is low), mixing maximizes
average human capital for a smaller interval of values of β2. However, as the diﬀerence
between the mean ability of individuals in both income groups becomes greater (i.e.,
as k increases), we have that mixing maximizes average human capital for a larger
13This is like assuming that all individuals are risk neutral behind the veil of ignorance.
14Note that I additionally assume here that the proportion of rich individuals in the population,
λ is equal to 1/4 and x(β1,k)=
x(β1,k)+x(β1,k)







interval of values of β2. As we saw in the previous section, an increase in k has a clear
positive impact on average human capital under mixing, whereas the ﬁnal impact on
average human capital under tracking, although positive, is not as strong as it is
under mixing. Thus, ceteris paribus, in societies where the diﬀerence between the
mean innate ability of rich versus poor students is larger, the diﬀerence between the
average human capital of each system will be lower.
T h ef o l l o w i n gt a b l ep r e s e n t st h ev a l u eo fET(θ1)−EM(θ1) for certain ﬁxed values
of x and β2:15
Table2.E T(θ1) − EM(θ1)
β2 \ x x(β2) b x(β2) x(β2)
1/4 0.1556 0.1584 0.1611
1/2 0.0304 0.0313 0.0322
3/4 −0.0028 −0.0024 −0.0020
1 −0.0183 −0.0181 −0.0179
(24)
Here, the impact of any increase of the wealth level of the population (measured
by x)o nt h ed i ﬀerence in the average level of human capital under one system ver-
sus the other depends crucially on the level of complementarity between peer-group
characteristics and innate ability. In particular, if these two factors are complements
(substitutes), then the diﬀerence increases (decreases) in absolute terms, with x.T h i s
relationship can be explained as follows. From Equations (9) and (22) we can check
that the average level of human capital under both systems is increasing in x.H o w -
ever, the impact of an increase in x on ET(θ1) is much higher than on EM(θ1).T h i s
is due to the complementarity between peer eﬀect and family background. Since an




, or on the composition of
the low and the high track m (and as opposed to what happens when k increases),
it will have a greater clear positive impact on ET(θ1) than it will on EM(θ1),s i n c e
the peer variable that rich students enjoy under tracking is higher than the one that
they enjoy under mixing. Therefore, as shown in Table 2 , if peers’ characteristics
15First note that b x(β2)=
x(β2)+x(β2)
2 .In addition we assume here that β1 =1 /4, λ =1 /4 and








and innate ability are complements (i.e. β2 < c β2 and tracking maximizes average hu-
man capital) then ET(θ1) − EM(θ1) increases with x, whereas if they are substitutes
(i.e. β2 > c β2 and mixing maximizes average human capital) then ET(θ1) − EM(θ1)
diminishes, in absolute terms, with x.
Another possibility, which has not been previously considered in the literature,
is to compare both systems in terms of human capital distribution. It should be
recall that, if the human capital distribution under a given system dominates that
of another according to ﬁrst order stochastic dominance, then all individuals can be
said to prefer the former over the latter.
However, it can be checked that neither system dominates the other according to
this criterion.
Proposition 1 Fr(θ1) ²FOSD Fs(θ1) for r,s = M,T and r 6= s for any β1,β2 and
k.
Proof. (i) FT(θ1) ²FOSD FM(θ1).U s i n gFT(θ1) from (21) and FM(θ1) from (8) we
can check that, for any θ1 ∈ (0,b], (FT(θ1) − FM(θ1)) > 0 for every λ,β1 and β2 and
k. (ii) FM(θ1) ²FOSD FT(θ1). Using Equations (21) and (8), we can check that for
any θ1 ∈ [f,g], (FT(θ1) − FM(θ1)) < 0 for every λ,β1 and β2 and k.
Figure 4 illustrates the previous result, where FM(θ1) and FT(θ1) are represented
in red and blue lines respectively. Therefore we can conclude that, regardless of
the properties pertaining to the process of human capital accumulation, there is no
unanimity in the population so as to which system to choose.















Finally, let us suppose that all individuals behind the “veil of ignorance” are risk
averse. In this case, they will prefer the less risky distribution of human capital.
This criteria leads to the concept of second order stochastic dominance. It can be
checked that the preferred system according to this criteria depends on the degree of
complementarity between the peer group eﬀect and innate ability, β2.B e l o wIs h o w
ﬁrst that, when peer eﬀect and innate ability are close complements then, there is no
unanimously preferred system in the population.
Proposition 2 Let β2 < c β2 then Fr(θ1) ²SOSD Fs(θ1) for r,s = M,T and r 6= s for
any β1 and k.




(FT(θ1) − FM(θ1))dθ1 > 0, for every β1 and k. (ii) FM(θ1) ²SOSD




F(y)dy,w h e r ey is the lowest value of y for which F(y)=1 .T h u st h e




under mixing EM(θ1)=d0 −
d0 Z
0
FT(θ1)dθ1 = h −
h Z
0
FM(θ1)dθ1.N o t et h a t ,i fFM(θ1)
ºSOSD FT(θ1), then the following inequality should hold: h − EM(θ1) ≤ h − ET(θ1).
The ﬁnal result is immediate from Table 1.
If the peer group eﬀect and innate ability are close substitutes (i.e., if β2 > c β2),
then there are no clear-cut results as to how mixing and tracking compare under
the criteria of second order stochastic dominance. Note that if β2 > c β2,t h e nw e
could have that mixing dominates tracking according to this criteria. However this
result is only true if FM and FT cross only once, in which case, and according to
the previous deﬁnition of the expected value of a random variable, the following







β2 > c β2. Using Equation (8) for FM and Equation (21) for FT we can check that,
for any θ1 ∈ (a,b), FT(θ1) − FM(θ1) > 0 for every λ, k, β1 and x, whereas for any
θ1 ∈ (d0,h), FT(θ1)−FM(θ1) < 0 for every λ,k, β1 and x. Thus, we just can conclude
that both cumulative distribution functions cross an odd number of times.
The complexity of the above human capital production function, makes it diﬃcult
to obtain clear analytical results for every β2 and k.H o w e v e r ,i fw ef o c u so nt h ec a s e
where peer eﬀect and individuals’ innate ability are perfect substitutes, i.e. where
β2 =1 ,w ec a nﬁnd some interesting cases where mixing dominates tracking accord-
ing to this criteria. In particular, the result will be driven by the level of income
inequality in the population. Remember from Section 2 that the income variance is
(x − 1)2λ(1 − λ), thus is increasing with x. Therefore, if we take the proportion of
rich individuals λ as given, income inequality will be characterized by the value of x.
The following proposition shows that if peer eﬀect and innate ability are substitutes
and if the income inequality of the population is low enough, then the population will
unanimously prefer mixing over tracking.16







1−β1.I fx ≤ e x(β1,k,λ)
and λ ≤ e λ(β1,k) then FM(θ1) ºSOSD FT(θ1) for any β1 and k.
Proof. See Appendix.
Note ﬁrst that x ≤ e x(β1,k,λ) implies that e(k,λ) ≤ c0(k,λ). That is, the “best”
poor individual (one with θ0 =1 ) will obtain a higher level of human capital under
mixing than will the “best” rich individual from within the low track (an individual
with θ0 =1 ). One might consider that mixing represents the public educational
system whereas tracking represents a private system comprised of both low and high
quality schools. Thus, this condition on x implies that the best public school student
can achieve a higher level of human capital than can the best low quality private
school student, which seems to be an empirically relevant case in most developed
countries (see Martínez-Mora (2006)).
16Recall from section 2 that an increase in x can be interpreted both as an increase in the mean







Thus we can conclude that, if peer eﬀect and innate ability are substitutes and
societal income level is not too unequal, then individuals prefer mixing. The intuition
could be as follows. In Table 2 we saw that if peer eﬀects and individuals’ innate
ability are close substitutes then the diﬀerence between the average human capital
under tracking and mixing is lower in societies with lower x.A s a r e s u l t , i n p o o r
societies risk averse individuals will prefer mixing.
Finally note that both e x(β1,k,λ) and e λ(k) are decreasing with k.T h a t i s , a s
society becomes more unequal in terms of the diﬀerence in the mean ability between
rich and poor, then it will be required a lower proportion of rich individuals in the
population and a lower income level of the rich, to get mixing as the preferred system.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper I have analyzed public intervention in education when the government
has to decide how to group students. I analyze two diﬀerent education systems:
tracking and mixing.
A number of previous works have studied the optimal education system at com-
pulsory level by focusing on mean achievement. This paper contributes to this line of
research by introducing critical inputs like family background into the human capital
production function, and by recognizing the existence of a positive dependence be-
tween family background and individuals’ innate ability and its eﬀect on each of the
two educational systems described above. In addition to that this paper contributes
to this literature by comparing both systems in terms of the induced distributions of
human capital at the end of compulsory school.
The paper allows for some extensions. In particular, it might be interesting to
check the robustness of my main results against speciﬁc features of the model. Here, I
assume that individual student achievement rises with increases in the average ability
level of their classmates, but at a decreasing rate. Another type of non-linearity
with regard to peer group eﬀect arises as a result of the “distance” impact. There
is empirical evidence that suggests that peer eﬀects are stronger when the distance







is small, and that as this distance increases, peer eﬀects become almost negligible.17
It might be interesting to model this eﬀect.
It might also be important to relax some of the assumptions presented here.
For example, we might consider other distributions of innate ability or introduce
the possibility of tracking students only within a certain subset of subjects as in
Epple, Newlon and Romano (2002). In addition to adding realism, incorporating this
possibility would make it easier for us to design an optimal educational system. On
the other hand, it would be interesting to explore how factors introduced by each the
two compulsory school systems discussed here can inﬂuence students decisions as to
whether or not to attend college (see Hidalgo-Hidalgo (2005) for a similar analysis
with a more stylized model).








Proof. of Proposition 3: Id e n o t eb ye λ(k) the proportion of rich individuals in
t h ep o p u l a t i o ns u c ht h a te x(β1,k,λ)=x(β1,k,λ) and thus, if λ ≤ e λ(β1,k) then















1−β1 where both e e x(β1,k,λ) ∈ [x(β1,k,λ),x(β1,k,λ)] and
x0(β1,k,λ) ∈ [x(β1,k,λ),x(β1,k,λ)] for any β1, k and λ. It can also be checked that
e x(β1,k,λ) < e e x(β1,k,λ) and that e x(β1,k,λ) < b x(β1,k,λ) for any β1, k and λ. Recall
that for every λ,k and β1,f r o mE q u a t i o n s( 8 )a n d( 2 1 ) ,w eh a v et h a tf o ra n yθ1 ∈ [a,c]
FT(θ1) >F M(θ1) whereas for any θ1 ∈ [d0,h] FT(θ1) <F M(θ1). In addition note from
Equations (6) and (15) that e(k,λ) ≤ c0(k,λ) if and only if x ≤ e e x(β1,k,λ).I tc a nb e
checked from Equations (8) and (21) that, if x ≤ e e x(β1,k,λ) then FT(θ1) <F M(θ1)
for all θ1 ∈ (d,c0). Now, if we evaluate the two C.D.F. for θ1 = b0 we can check









β1 − 1)(1 − λ).T h u s ,i f
x ≤ x0(β1,k,λ) then FT(b0) >F M(b0). If we evaluate the two C.D.F. for θ1 = g we can






λ and FT(g)=( 1−λ)+mλ
k.T h u s ,
FT(g) > (<)FM(g) if and only if x>(<)e x(β1,k,λ). Finally, from the deﬁnitions of
e x(β1,k,λ), e e x(β1,k,λ) and x0(β1,k,λ) it is immediate that if x<e x(β1,k,λ) then FM
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